Abstract: Inflation targeting has attracted attention to researchers and policy makers since the first attempt in New Zealand in 1990. This paper discusses a country's choice of inflation targeting by examining its driving forces with the dataset of 82 countries. The empirical result shows that countries' decision of adoption of inflation targeting depends highly on their development stage. For high-income or developed countries, the significant motive of monetary authority to choose inflation targeting is the desire to keep or enhance anti-inflation credibility, and inflation targeting could be a natural option under more floats with the absence of nominal exchange rate anchor. On the other hand, low-income or developing countries with the large size of public debts are not likely to choose inflation targeting, so that fiscal fragility would discourage monetary authority to adopt restrictive monetary policy under inflation targeting.
Introduction
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework to maintain prices or inflation rates at a target level or within a specific range by controlling policy rate and other monetary policy measures. Inflation targeting has attracted attention to researchers and policy makers since the first attempt in New Zealand in 1990. It is currently in use by central banks in many countries around the world (see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1999 , for various case studies and empirical evidences). One important aspect is that the adoption of inflation targeting can be seen in not only developed countries but also emerging or developing countries. Indeed, as of 2013, inflation targeting is officially adopted by 28 countries, among which there are 15 OECD countries and 13 non-OECD countries. Given this fact, this study attempts to discuss a country's choice of inflation targeting by empirically identifying the specific characteristics encouraging a country to choose the framework of inflation targeting. Since monetary authorities or central banks, particularly in developing countries, have the responsibility to assure price stability, our analysis could provide some important guidance for conducting monetary policy effectively.
Many studies have investigated how inflation targeting affects macroeconomic variables, including output, interest rate, inflation, and exchange rate pass-through and volatility, although some results are still unsettled due mainly to short history of inflation targeting (see e.g., Ball and Sheridan, 2003; Levin, Natalucci, and Piger, 2004; Vega and Winkelried, 2005; Genc, Lee, Rodriguez, and Lutz, 2007; De Mendonca, 2007; Lin and Ye, 2007, 2009; Gonsalves and Salles, 2008; Gonsalves and Carvalho, 2009; Brito and Bystedt, 2010; Lee, 2011; Willard, 2012; Odria, Castillo and Rodriguez, 2012) . Among them, some studies, including Goncalves and Salles (2008) , suggest the positive aspects that inflation targeting could reduce inflation rate and its fluctuation together with improved policy credibility. On the other hand, several works, such as Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Brito and Bystedt (2010) , reveal the skepticism on the effects of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance.
In contrast to works on the effect of inflation targeting, a relatively small number of studies have existed on the driving forces to adopt inflation targeting as a monetary policy measure. Amato and Gerlach (2002) discuss the roles of several preconditions for inflation targeting in transition and emerging economies, including central bank's independence, fiscal policy, and flexibility in interest rates and exchange rates.
Following the method of Ball and Sheridan (2003) and the argument of Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) on monetary independence, the empirical works of Carvalho (2008, 2009) over OECD countries present that the low level of debts, the high inflation, and flexible exchange rate are likely to inspire the choice of inflation targeting. As the most relevant work to our study, Hu (2006) This study also examines factors encouraging monetary authorities to choose inflation targeting by applying probit models, following the methodology employed by Ball and Sheridan (2003) , Carvalho (2008, 2009) , and Goncalves and Salles (2008) . Our sample covers 82 countries, among which 23 countries adopted inflation targeting up to 2010. Differently from the previous studies such as Hu (2006) , this study attempts to identify the differences in determinants of the adoption of inflation targeting between developed and developing countries by dividing our full sample into two groups of developed (high-income) and developing (low-income) countries. Our analysis enables us to discuss some important policy guidance for monetary authorities, particularly in developing countries, which are often struggling against less monetary credibility associated with higher inflation bias, large public indebtedness, and unstable political conditions.
The main results show some clear differences in the driving forces to adopt inflation targeting between developed and developing countries, which have not been identified in the past empirical studies. First, high inflation rates encourage monetary authorities of developed countries to shift their policy toward inflation targeting, while their effect on the choice of inflation targeting is insignificant in developing countries.
The desire to keep or enhance anti-inflation credibility could be identified as the significant motive of monetary authority to adopt inflation targeting for developed countries, but not for developing countries. Second, developed countries adopting more floats tend to choose inflation targeting, while this tendency cannot be observed in developing countries. Inflation targeting could be considered as a natural option for developed countries which adopt more floats with the absence of nominal exchange rate anchor. Third, developing countries with large size of public debts are not likely to adopt inflation targeting, due partly to the argument that they might have incentives to reduce the real value of public debts through inflation. Fiscal fragility restricts the capability of adopting inflation targeting. On the other hand, the adoption of inflation targeting in developed countries seems to be independent of their size of public debts.
One crucial issue is that monetary authority often makes the simultaneous choice of inflation targeting and exchange rate arrangement, which is required for the stable long-run existence of the policy framework (see Brenner and Sokoler, 2010) . This cannot be captured by our probit model assuming that past exchange rate arrangement is exogenous when a country chooses whether or not inflation targeting is adopted. Thus, by applying two alternative models, multinomial logit and bivariate probit models, we confirm the robustness of our estimated results derived from the probit model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical analysis, which describes data, methodology, and estimation results and examines the roles of characteristics influencing monetary policy concerning the choice of inflation targeting. In particular, we identify and discuss some clear differences in driving forces to choose inflation targeting between developed and developing countries. Final section provides conclusion.
Empirical analysis
Inflation targeting is a framework for monetary policy aiming at achieving and maintaining price stability, first introduced in New Zealand in 1990. It is identified by public announcement of official inflation target ranges at short-or medium-term time horizons and by fully confirmation that stable and low inflation is the primary long-run goal of monetary policy (see, e.g., Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1999) .
Although the definition of inflation targeting varies among economists, it generally contains several principles, such as public disclosure of short-and medium-term targets for inflation, commitment to keep price stability as the main goal of monetary policy, and transparency of central banks on their monetary policy strategy. These principles clarify that inflation targeting is not just public disclosure of the target.
Monetary authority in developing countries typically reports the target in their economic plan for the year ahead. However, such monetary policy may not be classified as inflation targeting, since it does not satisfy other principles.
This section evaluates the specific characteristics encouraging a country to choose inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework. Our empirical analysis first examines this issue by applying binary choice models with two possible outcomes of whether or not to choose inflation targeting. Moreover, for the robustness check we consider a country's choice of inflation targeting and exchange rate regime and investigate alternative models to capture four probable outcomes: (1) inflation targeting under a floating regime, (2) inflation targeting under a fixed regime, (3) non-inflation targeting under a floating regime, and (4) non-inflation targeting under a fixed regime.
Methodology and data
To discuss how a country is encouraged to adopt inflation targeting, we empirically examine the determinants of the probability of inflation targeting adoption by applying probit model for the cross-sectional dataset of 82 countries. We classify our sampled countries into two groups, depending on whether or not to adopt inflation targeting until 2010. The first is the treatment group consisting of 23 countries adopting inflation targeting, and the second is the control group of non-inflation targeting, consisting of the remaining 59 countries (see Tables 1 and 2 for the list of countries in our sample).
By applying the probit analysis, we estimate the following equation:
IT i = β 0 + β 1 ERR i + β 2 INF i + β 3 POLIT i + β 4 RGDPPC i + β 5 DEBT i + ϵ i , where IT i is the binary variable which equals unity if country i adopts inflation targeting and zero otherwise; ERR i is the measure of the exchange rate regime; INF i is inflation rate; POLIT i is the political risk measure; RGDPPC i is the income level; DEBT i is the fiscal status; and ϵ i is the error term with standard properties. In our sample, 23 countries have adopted inflation targeting in different years (see Table 1 ). All independent variables are the five-year average level of the corresponding variables over the periods prior to the adoption of inflation targeting.
Following Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Goncalves and Carvalho (2008) , the average levels of each independent variable for the treatment group of inflation targeting countries are computed by taking the five-year averages prior to the adoption of inflation targeting (see Table 1 for the period of adopting inflation targeting). For the control group of non-inflation targeting countries, we define the 'adoption year' as the average of the actual adopting years for all inflation targeting countries. The adoption year is identical at 2000 for all inflation targeting countries. Once we identify the adoption year, we compute the five-year averages prior to the adoption year as the hypothetical average levels of each independent variable for the control group.
Our study uses two different classifications, de jure and de facto classifications, as a measure of exchange rate regimes (ERR). As a de jure classification, this study uses self-reported exchange rate regime status of member countries as published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions). However, it is well known that a country's actual choice of exchange rate regimes is often different from its self-reported status.
1 Thus, this study also uses a de facto classification. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) construct de facto exchange rate regime classification through two important pieces of information, extensive data on market-determined exchange rates and detailed country chronologies, differently from the de jure standard IMF classification.
We compute the five-year averages of each measure of the two exchange rate In addition to the measures of exchange rate regimes, several factors could affect the choice of inflation targeting by monetary authority. Following Goncalves and considered as a managed exchange rate regime. Such a case can be recognized, particularly for developing countries facing the issue of 'fear to floating' (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) . Hence, we also use de facto exchange rate regime classification, proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004 For the better understanding of the adoption of inflation targeting between developed and developing countries, we conduct empirical analysis over full sample over 82 countries and two sub-samples (high-income group and low-income group).
The high-income group consists of countries with real GDP per capita larger than 6,000
US dollar (constant price of 2005), and the low-income group consists of countries with real GDP per capita less than 6,000 US dollar.
Some preliminaries
Before presenting the results of our empirical equation, this subsection briefly overviews the characteristics of economic and institutional variables and their relationships with the adoption of inflation targeting by showing summary statistics and correlation matrix. Table 1 shows the list of countries that have adopted inflation
targeting, and Table 2 shows the list of countries that have not adopted inflation targeting. These tables also present the adoption year for each inflation targeting country and the IMF de jure and Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) de facto exchange rate regimes during the pre-adoption period for each country (ERR_IMF2 and ERR_RR2). It is observed that 23 among our 82 sampled countries have adopted inflation targeting, and the exchange rate regimes for most of them were classified into floats before the adoption of inflation targeting. On the other hand, among 59 countries that have not adopted inflation targeting, many countries have adopted pegs before the hypothetical adoption year 2000. Table 3 shows the summary of statistics of variables used in our empirical analysis. First, the exchange rate arrangement in inflation targeting countries (ERR_IMF1, ERR_RR1, ERR_IMF2, and ERR_RR2) is more floats than that in noninflation targeting countries. This is consistent with the finding of Concalves and
Carvalho (2007) in that absence of the exchange rate anchor increases the probability of adopting inflation targeting. Second, inflation rate in inflation targeting countries (INF) is higher than that in non-inflation targeting countries, so that high inflation countries tend to adopt inflation targeting. Third, the ratio of public debt to GDP in non-inflation targeting countries (DEBT) is higher than that in inflation targeting countries, so that countries with sound fiscal status tend to adopt inflation targeting. These three results can also be supported by the positive correlation between the inflation targeting dummy (DIT) and the measure of exchange rate regimes (ERR_IMF1, ERR_RR1, ERR_IMF2, and ERR_RR2), the positive correlation between DIT and inflation (INF), and the negative correlation between DIT and the ratio of public debt (DEBT), as shown in Table 4 .
Relevantly to the first result in the previous discussion, which is related to the adoption of inflation targeting and exchange rate arrangements during the pre-inflation target period, we can classify all countries into four groups: inflation targeting with pegs, inflation targeting with floats, non-inflation targeting with pegs, and non-inflation targeting with floats. Table 5 This might be related to the discussion of 'fear of floating' in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) that countries announcing floats, in practice, tend to implement interventions or use other tools to peg their exchange rate to the anchor currency. In contrast to the group of inflation targeting countries, many of non-inflation targeting countries have de jure and de facto adopted pegs before the hypothetical adoption year 2000.
Results
This subsection presents empirical results to evaluate how countries' several specific characteristics, such as exchange rate regimes, inflation, and fiscal status, affect monetary authorities' choice of inflation targeting as a main monetary framework. Since our dependent variable is a binary choice, we apply the probit analysis to estimate our empirical equation. Table 6 shows the results of our probit regressions over all countries for each measure of exchange rate arrangements (ERR_IMF1, ERR_RR1, ERR_IMF2, and ERR_RR2). The coefficients on all measures of exchange rate arrangements are significantly positive, so that the flexibility of exchange rates, based on both de jure and de facto classifications, would enhance countries' motivation to adopt inflation targeting.
This result could be consistent with the findings of Hu (2006) and Goncalves and Carvalho (2008) . A flexible exchange rate regime is a crucial precondition for the choice of inflation targeting. The exchange rate nominal anchor should be subordinated to inflation targeting, since the rigidity of exchange rate is unsuitable for inflation targeting policy in the long-run (see Brenner and Sokoler, 2010) .
In addition, the coefficients on DEBT are significantly negative. A sound fiscal position would encourage the country to adopt inflation targeting, which coincides with the results of Hu (2006) and Goncalves and Carvalho (2008) . Hu (2006) suggests that the government facing a fragile fiscal position might put pressure on the central bank to implement expansionary monetary policy and to finance public debts, which could lead to the impossibility to adopt inflation targeting. On the other hand, the coefficients on INF, POLIT, and RGDPPC are insignificant, so that inflation, political stability, and the income level would not affect the choice of inflation targeting. The above results are based on the empirical analysis over all sampled countries.
To discuss differences in economic and institutional features between developing and developed countries, we conduct the probit analysis for each of the two sub-samples (high-and low-income groups) depending on the income level of countries. (2006), Goncalves and Carvalho (2008) , and Brenner and Sokoler (2010) only for high-income countries.
The second difference between high-and low-income groups is related to the ratio of public debts to GDP (DEBT). The coefficients on DEBT for the low-income group are significantly negative. However, the coefficients for the high-income group are less clear, since columns A and B under de jure exchange rate arrangements show the significantly negative coefficients, while columns C and D under de facto exchange rate arrangements show the insignificant coefficients. Low-income countries with a sound fiscal position would be encouraged to adopt inflation targeting, while fiscal status might not matter on the choice of inflation targeting for high-income countries.
These results coincide with the findings of Hu (2006) and Goncalves and Carvalho (2008) only for low-income countries. Moreover, our empirical findings for the lowincome group also support the argument of Amato and Gerlach (2002) in that large public debts would discourage emerging economies to adopt inflation targeting as they provide incentives to reduce the real value of public debts through inflation.
As the third difference, the coefficients on inflation (INF) for the high-income group are significantly positive at the 1% significance level, while those for the low- (2006) and Goncalves and Carvalho (2008) to all countries uniformly might lead to the misunderstanding of real determinants of inflation targeting.
Alternative methods for robustness check
The probit analysis in the previous subsections has clearly investigated a country's decision to choose inflation targeting. However, it should be noted that our probit estimations may suffer from one important shortage. The probit model has assumed that monetary authority decides whether or not to adopt inflation targeting with exchange rate arrangement as exogenously given. However, exchange rate arrangements might not be a precondition of the adoption of inflation targeting, i.e., monetary authority makes the choice of inflation targeting and exchange rate regimes simultaneously. To incorporate this feature into our analysis, we apply two alternative methods, multinomial logit and bivariate probit models, and check the robustness of our results derived from the probit analysis in the previous subsections.
Multinomial logit regressions
In this subsection, we apply multinomial logit model of categorical independent variables capturing the simultaneous choice of inflation targeting and exchange rate regimes for the same cross-sectional data used in the previous subsections. To discuss determinants of the choice, we estimate the following empirical model: One difficulty is that we need to identify which exchange rate regime each country adopted at the timing of the adoption of inflation targeting (the adoption year 2000 for non-inflation targeting countries). Since exchange rate arrangements are often changed in some countries, we use the three-year average of the measure of exchange rate arrangements after the adoption year as its approximation. To do so, we first generate the binary choice variables of exchange rate arrangements, i.e., floats or pegs, using the de jure IMF classification and the de facto Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) classification, which are represented by the rank from 1 to 5.
We compute the three-year averages of each measure of the two exchange rate regimes after the adoption year (ERR_IMF3 and ERR_RR3). The larger average values, ERR_IMF3 and ERR_RR3, imply more floats, i.e., more flexibility of exchange rate regimes, after the adoption year. Then we compute the dummy variable (ERR_IMF4) which equals one if ERR_IMF3 ≥ 3 and zero if ERR_IMF3 < 3, and the dummy variable (ERR_RR4) which equals one if ERR_RR3 ≥ 3 and zero if ERR_RR3 < 3. In terms of de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements, ERR_IMF4 = 1 and ERR_RR4 = 1 suggest that after the adoption year, the countries have adopted floats, while ERR_IMF4 = 0 and ERR_RR4 = 0 suggest that the countries have adopted pegs.
By using the two binary variables, the adoptions of inflation targeting (IT) and exchange rate regimes (ERR_IMF4 and ERR_RR4), we create the categorical variable ( arrangements is based on the three-year averages of the measures of de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements after the adoption year. The result is similar to that in Table   5 , where the classification of exchange rate arrangements is based on the five-year averages before the adoption year. All inflation targeting countries except one country (Romania) de jure adopted floats after the adoption year, while around half of inflation targeting countries de facto adopted pegs. In contrast to the group of inflation targeting countries, many of non-inflation targeting countries have de jure and de facto adopted pegs before the adoption year.
Tables 9 and 10 present estimated results of the multinomial logit models over the full sample and the sub-samples of high-and low-income groups, based on de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements, respectively. It should be noted that only one country is classified into the adoption of inflation with pegs under the de jure classification. Thus, we exclude this country from our sample, so that the categorical variable in Table 9 takes only three values, one of which is the baseline category. In general, the results of the multinomial logit models are consistent with our findings from the probit models. 
Bivariate probit regressions
This subsection applies another alternative model, bivariate probit models, for the robustness check of the results derived from the probit and multinomial logit analysis in the previous subsections. The bivariate probit model is a generalization of the probit model to estimate two correlated binary outcomes jointly. Since it seems that the decision of the adoption of inflation targeting is correlated with the choice of exchange rate regimes, the bivariate probit model can be appropriate for jointly examining these two choices. Our bivariate probit model has the following simultaneous equations (IT and ER equations): (2004) classifications of exchange rate arrangements. The country's regime is regarded as floats if the five-year average during the pre-IT period is from 3 to 5, and it is regarded as pegs if the five-year average during the pre-IT period is less than 3. (2004) classifications of exchange rate arrangements. The country's regime is regarded as floats if the five-year average during the pre-IT period is from 3 to 5, and it is regarded as pegs if the five-year average during the pre-IT period is less than 3. (3) The adoption year is assumed to be 2000 for all non-inflation targeting countries. Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; (2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (3) ERR_IMF1 and ERR_RR1 represent the five-year averages of the IMF de jure and Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) classifications of exchange rate regimes during the adoption year, respectively. ERR_IMF2 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if ERR_IMF1 is from 3 to 5, and 0 otherwise. ERR_RR2 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if ERR_RR1 is from 3 to 5, and 0 otherwise. Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; (2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (3) The high income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is higher than 6,000 US dollar, and the low income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is less than 6,000 US dollar; (4) ERR_IMF1 and ERR_RR1 represent the five-year averages of the IMF de jure and Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) classifications of exchange rate regimes during the adoption year, respectively. ERR_IMF2 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if ERR_IMF1 is from 3 to 5, and 0 otherwise. ERR_RR2 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if ERR_RR1 is from 3 to 5, and 0 otherwise. Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; (2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (3) The high income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is higher than 6,000 US dollar, and the low income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is less than 6,000 US dollar; (4) Exchange rate regime is based on the threeyear average of the IMF de jure classification from the year of the inflation targeting policy adoption for inflation targeting countries and from the adoption year 2000 for non-inflation targeting countries; (5) The baseline category of the multinomial logit models is the non-inflation targeting with pegs; (6) Romania is excluded from the observation. Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; (2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (3) The high income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is higher than 6,000 US dollar, and the low income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is less than 6,000 US dollar; (4) Exchange rate regime is based on the three-year average of Reinhar and Rogoff's (2004) de facto classification from the year of the inflation targeting policy adoption for inflation targeting countries and from the adoption year 2000 for non-inflation targeting countries; (5) The baseline category of the multinomial logit models is the non-inflation targeting with pegs. Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; (2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (3) The high income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is higher than 6,000 US dollar, and the low income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is less than 6,000 US dollar; (4) The dummy variable of exchange rate regime is based on the three-year average of the IMF de jure classification from the year of the inflation targeting policy adoption for inflation targeting countries and from the adoption year 2000 for noninflation targeting countries. Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; (2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (3) The high income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is higher than 6,000 US dollar, and the low income group consists of countries whose real GDP per capita in 2005 is less than 6,000 US dollar; (4) The dummy variable of exchange rate regime is based on the three-year average of Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) de facto classification from the year of the inflation targeting policy adoption for inflation targeting countries and from the adoption year 2000 for non-inflation targeting countries.
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